Coordination Model and Noninterference  by Aldini, Alessandro
p ( )
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume85.html 17 pages
Coordination Model and Noninterference
Alessandro Aldini
1;2
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie dell'Informazione
Universita di Urbino \Carlo Bo"
Urbino, Italy
Abstract
Noninterference properties for the analysis of secure information ow are proposed
in the setting of a process algebra modeling some Linda coordination primitives
(asynchronous communication and read operation). To this end, relaxed denitions
of equivalence are introduced that take into consideration the observational power
of the external observer. The resulting taxonomy is compared with corresponding
security denitions for synchronous communication models. As a result, we em-
phasize how the proposed coordination model aects the expressive power of some
noninterference properties, by giving a new intuition to the relative merits.
1 Introduction
Condentiality issues in multi-level security systems have been deeply and
successfully treated in several formal models. In particular, we want to fo-
cus on those semantics-based models (i.e., models that analyze the program
behavior to verify security properties) that rely on the noninterference ap-
proach to information ow analysis (see, e.g., [5] and the references therein).
The basic idea of noninterference [7] is that lack of implicit information ow
from high- to low-security levels is ensured if the interactions observed at
the low-security level are invariant under changes in high-level behaviors. In
practice, by interacting with the low-level interface of the system at hand, an
observer cannot deduce anything about the interplay between a high-class user
and the high-security part of the system. A common feature of most of the
noninterference-based formal models is the synchrony of both input and out-
put operations, which represent the possible interactions between the system
and the environment. In essence, the main principle behind a synchronous
communication model is that the environment and the modeled system must
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agree on the events to be performed if we want that they really happen. For
instance, a condential high-level output takes place the instant a high-class
user of the environment is available to accept it. Symmetrically, an input
operation is allowed to be performed the instant the environment activates
that input. On the basis of such a symmetric treatment of communication
primitives, the system at hand is analyzed in order to establish whether or
not a low-security observer can distinguish alternative behaviors of the system
that dier in the high-level operations only. The motivation for symmetrically
treating inputs and outputs in security issues is argued in many works (see,
e.g., [8]). Anyway, in many cases a model that does not distinguish output
actions from input ones can lead to noninterference results that turn out to
be too restrictive. In fact, there may be several output communications that
cannot be refused, such as the appearance of information on a screen, and
that allow the system to proceed just after performing them (as emphasized,
e.g., in [13]). Since their occurrence is entirely uninuenced by the high-level
environment behavior, condential output operations cannot cause an infor-
mation leakage from a high-level user to a low-level unauthorized observer that
interact with the same system. In essence, the execution of an asynchronous
high-security output can be neither refused (delayed) by the high-level user
nor observed by the low-level user.
In this paper, we analyze the eect of considering output events as asyn-
chronous communications on the expressive power of some noninterference
properties. In particular, we consider the CCS-based security properties in-
troduced in [4] to describe in a process algebraic setting the basic idea of non-
interference. The formal framework we employ, which is borrowed from [3],
expresses some Linda coordination primitives (asynchronous communication
and read operation) in the setting of a nondeterministic process algebra in-
spired by CCS [12]. In this model, asynchronous communication is realized
by means of a so-called tuplespace, which models a shared box that explicitly
(i) receives messages (also called tuples) generated via output operations, and
(ii) allows processes of the environment to remove (read without removing)
the same messages via input (read) operations. Hence, from the observability
viewpoint, the focus moves from the behavior of the system, which can inter-
act with the environment via the execution of inputs and outputs, to the set
of tuples that can be removed (read) from the tuplespace. In other words,
since communications take place through access to the tuplespace, what an
observer can see is just the tuplespace. As a consequence, we have that a read
operation performed by the system has the same eect as an internal action,
since it does not cause changes in the tuplespace. Obviously, this requires
that the equivalence relations used to dene the observational semantics of
our language must take into consideration the observational power of an ex-
ternal user. To this aim, two classical notions of equivalence will be rephrased
in this asynchronous communication model, i.e. a trace equivalence and a weak
bisimulation equivalence.
38
Aldini
As far as the security context is concerned, the tuplespace is divided into
a high-level part containing high-security tuples, which are emitted (and can
be consumed) by high-level users, and a low-level part containing unclassied,
public messages, which are generated (and can be consumed) by low-level
users. To make it clear the relationship between such an asynchronous com-
munication model and the related security issues, some noninterference prop-
erties are dened in the same line of [4]. One goal consists of studying the kind
of information ow that can be revealed in a Linda-like coordination model,
where users deal with an explicit communication interface, the tuplespace,
instead of directly interacting with the system, and a low-level observer can
infer the behavior of high-level users by manipulating the public portion of the
tuplespace only. On the other hand, another result we present is a comparison
of the resulting taxonomy with the classication of the corresponding prop-
erties of [4]. The emphasis is on the inuence of the described coordination
model upon the security analysis of concurrent computer systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the
process algebra and the formal framework necessary to conduct the nonin-
terference analysis. Then, in Sect. 3 we propose in this asynchronous setting
some security properties of [4] and, through several examples, we study their
expressive power, by emphasizing similarities and dierences with respect to
the synchronous setting of [4]. Finally, in Sect. 4 we report on related work
and some conclusions.
2 Security Asynchronous Language
With respect to synchronous languages, where the constituent elements are
actions representing system activities, the basic elements of the asynchronous
calculus are messages, which can be put in (removed from) the tuplespace.
Formally, we denote by M, ranged over by a; b; : : :, the set of message names.
As usual in security models, we distinguish between high-level message names,
denoted by setM
H
, and low-level message names, denoted by setM
L
, so that
M
H
and M
L
are two disjoint sets that form a covering of M.
The security asynchronous language, here called SAL, is a slight variant
of LINPA [3], which in turn is an asynchronous version of CCS [12]. In par-
ticular, SAL is equipped with the input, output, and read operations, and
enriched with the hiding operator, which is needed for the denition of secu-
rity properties. Indeed, abstraction is used to specify the observational power
of each external observer, depending on the security level of such an observer.
The set of process terms is generated by the grammar:
C ::= 0 j :C j CjC j C + C j Cna j C=a j Z
where 0 is the empty process (we usually omit it when it is clear from the
context), and j ; + ; na; =a denote the usual parallel, choice, restriction,
and hiding operators. Moreover, for each constant Z we have a corresponding
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denition Z
def
= C, where C is guarded on constants [12]. The possible prexes
 are:
 ::=  j in(a) j out(a) j rd(a)
where  is the internal, unobservable action, and in(a) and out(a) express
the usual input and output primitives of Linda, respectively. More precisely,
out(a) produces, in one internal step, a new tuple hai (containing message a)
that is put in the tuplespace. Hence, an output operation is non-blocking as it
allows the system to proceed just after performing the rendering of the tuple.
Instead, in(a) removes, if present, the tuple hai from the tuplespace. Note
that if such a tuple is not present in the tuplespace, then the input operation
is blocked. Similarly, rd(a) denotes the blocking reading of any message a
without removing it from the tuplespace. Tuples are not considered in the
syntax of processes; instead, they are described as states, which are dened as
terms generated by the syntax:
P ::= hai j C j P jP j Pna j P=a:
In practice, states model the parallel composition of tuples that are present
in the tuplespace and processes that handle the tuplespace. We call A the set
of possible agents generated by the grammar above, ranged over by P;Q; : : :.
The operational semantics of SAL is dened through the structural congru-
ence , which is dened as the smallest congruence that satises the axioms
of Table 1. In axioms (x) and (xi), function fn(P ) denotes the set of free
names of P and is dened as follows:
fn(0) = ;
fn(hai) = fag
fn(P jQ) = fn(P +Q) = fn(P ) [ fn(Q)
fn(Pna) = fn(P=a) = fn(P )nfag
fn(in(a):P ) = fn(out(a):P ) = fn(rd(a):P ) = fag [ fn(P )
fn(Z) = fn(P ) if Z
def
= P:
With abuse of notation, in axiom (xii), which is {conversion, we use P [b=a]
to denote the term obtained by renaming all the free occurrences of the name
a in P with the fresh name b. Then, we dene the operational semantics of
SAL as the labelled transition system (A;Act ;!), where (i) the states are
agents of the language; (ii) Act is a set of transition labels (ranged over by
; 
0
; : : :) dened as Act = fg [ O [ I [ R, where O = fa j a 2 Mg is the
set of labels expressing oer of tuples of the tuplespace to the environment,
I =M is the set of labels denoting consumption of tuples from the tuplespace,
and R = fa j a 2 Mg is the set of labels denoting reading of tuples of the
tuplespace; (iii) the transition relation ! A  Act  A is dened as the
least relation satisfying the axioms and the rules in Table 2. In the following,
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(i) P j0  P
(ii) P jQ  QjP
(iii) (P jQ)jR  P j(QjR)
(iv) P + 0  P
(v) P + P  P
(vi) P +Q  Q+ P
(vii) (P +Q) +R  P + (Q +R)
(viii) 0 op a  0
(ix) (Pop a)op b  (Pop b)op a
(x) (P +Q)op a  P + (Qop a) a 62 fn(P )
(xi) (P jQ)op a  P j(Qop a) a 62 fn(P )
(xii) Pop a  P [b=a]op b b fresh
(xiii) Z  P Z
def
= P
op 2 fn; =g
Table 1
Structural congruence for SAL
we assume that set L = O[ I [R is ranged over by ; 
0
; : : :. Since the set of
message names is partitioned into high-level names and low-level ones, we also
partition L into high-level labels and low-level ones, denoted by sets Act
H
and
Act
L
, respectively, such that  2 fa; a; ag belongs to Act
H
(Act
L
) i a 2 M
H
(a 2 M
L
).
When dening security properties, it will be useful to employ a restriction
operator Pn
I
a, which limits its scope to input transition labels only, whose
semantics is dened as follows:
P

! P
0
Pn
I
a

! P
0
n
I
a
 6= a:
Similarly, it is possible to dene the operator Pn
O
a, which prevents the exe-
cution of a labelled transitions only, and, in the same line, the operator P=
O
a,
which hides a labelled transitions only.
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(prex) :P

! P out(a):P

! haijP
in(a):P
a
! P rd(a):P
a
! P
(tuple) hai
a
! 0
(sum)
P

! P
0
P +Q

! P
0
(par)
P

! P
0
P jQ

! P
0
jQ
P
a
! P
0
Q
a
!Q
0
P jQ

! P
0
jQ
0
P
a
! P
0
Q
a
!Q
0
P jQ

! P
0
jQ
(res)
P

! P
0
Pna

! P
0
na
 62 fa; a; ag
(hid)
P

! P
0
P=a

! P
0
=a
 2 fa; a; ag
P

! P
0
P=a

! P
0
=a
 62 fa; a; ag
(congr)
P  Q Q

!Q
0
P
0
 Q
0
P

! P
0
Table 2
Operational semantics of SAL
2.1 Equivalences
Since the analysis of security properties is based on equivalence checking and
focuses on the observable interactions between the environment and the system
at hand, we need an equivalence relation that abstracts away from invisible 
actions. Moreover, in the setting of an asynchronous language, we also must
pay attention on what the external observer is allowed to see. As empha-
sized in [3], an observer can see and manipulate the tuplespace, while he has
no means for inferring whether or not the system is executing input (read)
operations (this intuition leads, e.g., to the denition of a barbed bisimula-
tion [1]). Based on these considerations, we dene two adequate equivalences
for SAL, i.e. a trace equivalence and a weak bisimulation equivalence (which
extends the strong rd -bisimulation of [3]), which can be used to express secu-
rity properties. In essence, we join the requirements expressed in [3], which
take into consideration the observational power of the external user, with the
usual denitions employed in [4,6].
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Denition 2.1 The expression P

)P
0
stands for P (

! )

P
1

! P
2
(

! )

P
0
,
where (

! )

denotes a possibly empty sequence of  labelled transitions. De-
noted with  = 
1
; : : : ; 
n
2 L

a sequence of visible actions, the expression
P

)P
0
stands for P

1
)P
1

2
) : : :

n 1
) P
n 1

n
)P
0
. If  is the empty sequence
hi, then P
hi
)P
0
stands for P (

! )

P
0
. We say that P
0
is reachable from P ,
denoted P )P
0
, if 9 : P

)P
0
.
With abuse of notation, we say that  2  = 
1
; : : : ; 
n
if  = 
i
for some
1  i  n. We dene the set A

of reading operations occurring in  as A

=
f 2  j 9a 2 M :  = ag. Given a sequence , where A

= fa
1
; : : : ; a
m
g,
we dene S

as the set of sequences obtained from  by replacing each a
i
(1  i  m) within  with (a
i
)

. Note that  2 S

and S

= fg if A

= ;.
The trace equivalence for SAL is dened as follows:
Denition 2.2 Given P 2 A, the set T (P ) of traces associated with P is
dened as T (P ) = f 2 L

j 9P
0
: P

)P
0
g.
Given P;Q 2 A, we say that P and Q are rd -trace equivalent, denoted
P 
T
rd
Q, if and only if for each  2 T (P ) there exists Æ 2 T (Q) such that
Æ 2 S(), and vice versa.
In the following, the expression P
^
)P
0
stands for P

)P
0
if  6=  , and
for P (

! )

P
0
if  =  . Note that (

! )

stands for zero or more internal
transitions, while

) requires at least one internal transition.
The weak bisimulation equivalence for SAL is dened as follows:
Denition 2.3 An equivalence relation R on A is a weak rd -bisimulation if
(P;Q) 2 R implies:

if P

! P
0
, with  6= a, then 9Q
0
such that Q
^
)Q
0
and (P
0
; Q
0
) 2 R;

if P
a
! P
0
then 9Q
0
such that Q((

! )

(
a
! )

)

Q
0
and (P
0
; Q
0
) 2 R.
Two agents P and Q are weakly rd -bisimilar, written P 
B
rd
Q, if there
exists a weak rd -bisimulation R such that (P;Q) 2 R.
Based on the denitions above, an a labelled transition can be simulated
with a mixed (possibly empty) sequence of  and a labelled transitions. The
intuition, which is the weak version of the idea reported in [3], is that since a
read operation does not alter the content of the tuplespace, from the external
observer standpoint the behavior of rd(a) is the same as that expressed by a
possibly empty sequence of unobservable actions and read operations. On the
other hand, a  labelled transition cannot be simulated with a mixed sequence
of  and a labelled transitions. This is because the behavior of rd(a) is more
restrictive than the behavior of an internal  action, since the execution of
rd(a) implies that a tuple hai is in the tuplespace.
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3 Noninterference Properties
In this section, we formalize some noninterference properties based on the two
equivalence relations introduced in the previous section. The denitions we
present are based on the classication of security properties described in [4,6]
for a synchronous communication model. In the setting of an asynchronous
communication model, the goal of such denitions is to verify whether or not
a low-level user can infer the behavior of the high-level user by observing the
tuplespace during the agent execution.
For the sake of readability, we assume that if L = fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g  M, then
the abbreviation P op L stands for P op a
1
: : : op a
n
, with op 2 fn; =g.
3.1 Trace-based Properties
The denition of noninterference states that there is no observable distinction
(by the low-level user) between the behavior of the system when it accepts
high-level inputs and the behavior of the same system when it does not inter-
act with the high-level environment. In the setting of SAL, this means that
the low-level content of the tuplespace is not aected by high-level input oper-
ations. More precisely, a low-level user should not be able to guess the content
of the high-level portion of the tuplespace by interacting with the low-level
part of the tuplespace. We rephrase the related property, called Nondetermin-
istic Noninterference (NNI) [4], in the context of SAL, by dening the rd -trace
based NNI (rd -NNI).
Denition 3.1 (rd -NNI) P 2 rd -NNI , P=M
H

T
rd
(Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
:
In synchronous communication models, NNI is not adequate to reveal inter-
ferences due to high-level outputs. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen such
a property by symmetrically treating input actions and output actions. This
leads to the denition of Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (SNNI),
which states that both high-level inputs and high-level outputs should not
aect the low-level behavior of the system. However, in an asynchronous
setting, such an extension is not needed, as we now formally show in the con-
text of SAL. In particular, since output is asynchronous, the high-level user
cannot prevent the system from executing an out(a) operation or, in other
words, there is no relation between the emission of a message performed by
the system and the behavior of the high-level user. As a consequence, such a
kind of operation cannot help the low-level user to deduce the behavior of the
high-level user.
Denition 3.2 (rd -SNNI) P 2 rd -SNNI , P=M
H

T
rd
PnM
H
:
In order to prove the proposition stating that rd -NNI and rd -SNNI are
equivalent in the context of SAL, we need the following lemma. As far as the
notation is concerned, we employ the function low : L

! Act

L
, which takes
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a trace  and removes all the high-level actions from it (i.e., returns the low-
level subsequence of ), and the function highinput : L

! (Act
H
\ I)

, which
extracts from a trace the subsequence composed of all its high-level inputs.
Lemma 3.3 The following hold:
(i) P 2 rd-NNI , 8 2 T (P ), 9Æ 2 T (P ) such that low(Æ) 2 S(low()) ^
highinput(Æ) = hi.
(ii) P 2 rd -SNNI , 8 2 T (P ), 9Æ 2 T (P ) such that Æ 2 S(low()).
Proof.
(i)
()) 8 2 T (P ), low() 2 T (P=M
H
). Then, by hypothesis 9
0
2 T ((Pn
I
M
H
)
=M
H
) such that 
0
2 S(low()) and highinput(
0
) = hi. The result follows
from the fact that 9Æ 2 T (P ) such that 
0
= low(Æ) and highinput(Æ) = hi.
(() It is trivial to see that 8 2 T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
); 9Æ 2 T (P=M
H
) such
that Æ 2 S(), since T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
)  T (P=M
H
). On the other hand,
8 2 T (P=M
H
); 9
0
2 T (P ) such that low(
0
) = . By hypothesis, 9Æ 2
T (P ) such that low(Æ) 2 S(low(
0
)) and highinput(Æ) = hi. Therefore, it
follows Æ 2 T (Pn
I
M
H
) and low(Æ) 2 T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
). The result derives
from low(Æ) 2 S(low(
0
)) = S().
(ii)
()) 8 2 T (P ), low() 2 T (P=M
H
). Then, by hypothesis 9Æ 2 T (PnM
H
)
such that Æ 2 S(low()), from which we immediately derive the result, since
Æ 2 T (P ).
(() It is trivial to see that 8 2 T (PnM
H
); 9Æ 2 T (P=M
H
) such that
Æ 2 S(), since T (PnM
H
)  T (P=M
H
). On the other hand, 8 2 T (P=M
H
),
9
0
2 T (P ) such that low(
0
) = . By hypothesis, 9Æ 2 T (P ) such that
Æ 2 S(low(
0
)), from which we derive the result, since Æ 2 T (PnM
H
). 2
Proposition 3.4 P 2 rd-NNI , P 2 rd -SNNI.
Proof.
(() We start by observing that T (PnM
H
)  T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
) and
T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
)  T (P=M
H
). By hypothesis, if  2 T (P=M
H
), then
9Æ 2 T (PnM
H
) (and, as a consequence, Æ 2 T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
)) such that
Æ 2 S(). On the other hand, if  2 T ((Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
), then  2 T (P=M
H
)
and, by hypothesis, 9Æ 2 T (PnM
H
) (and, as a consequence, Æ 2 T (P=M
H
))
such that Æ 2 S().
()) By hypothesis and by Lemma 3.3(i), 8 2 T (P ), 9Æ 2 T (P ) such that
highinput(Æ) = hi and low(Æ) 2 S(low()). Since highinput(Æ) = hi and since
output is non-blocking, there exists Æ
0
2 T (P ) such that Æ
0
= low(Æ). Hence,
by Lemma 3.3(ii), we derive the result. 2
To make it clear the intuition behind the asynchronous communication
assumption, we propose a comparison with the synchronous case through some
examples.
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Example 3.5 Consider the agent in(h):out(l):0, with h 2 M
H
and l 2 M
L
.
A low-security observer can easily distinguish between the situation in which
the high-level user does not interact with the agent and that in which the
agent consumes a tuple hhi previously emitted by the high-level user. Indeed,
by verifying the presence of the tuple hli in the tuplespace, a low-level observer
can infer the high-level user behavior, even if the presence of hhi cannot be
directly checked by the low-level user. Formally, we have that the agent is
not rd -NNI secure (see Fig. 1). Similarly, in the synchronous setting of [4],
the corresponding agent is not NNI secure, as the low-level output is blocked
until the execution of the low-level input, which is entirely guided by the
high-security user. Such an example shows that NNI and rd -NNI capture the
same kind of interferences. This is because the synchronous and asynchronous
models of communication consider inputs as blocking operations.
< l >< h >
TS
H
S
H
high
level
low
level
high
level
low
level
agent
l
h h
agent
Fig. 1. Agent in(h):out (l):0 { the tuplespace from the low-level viewpoint.
Now, replace the input operation in the agent above by a corresponding
output operation, thus obtaining the new agent out(h):out(l):0. By observing
the low-security part of the tuplespace, the low-level user cannot deduce any-
thing about the behavior of the high-level user. Indeed, the presence of the
tuple hli is not enough to establish whether or not the emitted tuple hhi has
been consumed by the high-level user. Formally, the agent is rd -SNNI secure
(see Fig. 2). On the contrary, in the synchronous setting of [4], the corre-
sponding agent is NNI secure, but not SNNI secure, as the output operation
is blocking, i.e. the execution of the low-level output reveals that a high-class
user accepted the high-level output.
TS < h > < l >
high
level
low
level
?
H
agent
h l
Fig. 2. Agent out(h):out (l):0 { the tuplespace from the low-level viewpoint.
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3.2 Bisimulation-based Properties
Similarly as seen in the previous section, we can dene the noninterference
property and its strong version on the basis of the weak rd -bisimulation equiv-
alence dened in Sect. 2, thus obtaining the rd -Bisimulation NNI (rd -BNNI)
and the rd -Bisimulation SNNI (rd -BSNNI).
Denition 3.6 (rd -BNNI, rd -BSNNI)

P 2 rd -BNNI , P=M
H

B
rd
(Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
:

P 2 rd -BSNNI , P=M
H

B
rd
PnM
H
:
We rst observe that, as it is easy to verify, P 
B
rd
Q implies P 
T
rd
Q.
Indeed, every trace of Q must be a trace also for P since P can simulate the
behavior of Q, and vice versa. Hence, we have that rd -BNNI  rd -NNI and
rd -BSNNI  rd -SNNI. However, with respect to the trace-based scenario, the
equivalence relation between rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI does not hold. This is
because the weak rd -bisimulation equivalence is able to detect deadlocks and
to discriminate agents also according to the nondeterministic structure of their
labelled transition systems.
Example 3.7 Let us consider agent P
def
= out(h):in(h):out(l) (with h 2 M
H
and l 2 M
L
) and verify the rd -BSNNI property. On the one hand, the seman-
tics of PnM
H
is given by PnM
H

! (hhi j in(h):out(l))nM
H

! out(l)nM
H

!
hlinM
H

l
! 0. Intuitively, if the high-level environment does not interact with
the tuplespace, then the low-level user can read/consume the tuple hli emit-
ted by the agent. On the other hand, it can be veried that P=M
H
leads
to the same result. The intuition is that since each high-level operation is
hidden, then the agent evolves, through a number of internal steps, into state
hli. Therefore, P 2 rd -BSNNI. However, if the high-level user consumes the
tuple hhi emitted by P , thus preventing the execution of the input operation
in(h), then the agent reaches a deadlock state without emitting the tuple
hli. Such a behavior is captured by the rd -BNNI property. Indeed, agent
((hhi j in(h):out(l))n
I
M
H
)=M
H
, which is reachable from (Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
, en-
ables a  labelled transition obtained by hiding the action

h, representing the
output of tuple hhi. This transition leads to agent ((in(h):out(l))n
I
M
H
)=M
H
,
where the execution of the input operation is prevented. The eect of such a
behavior is that P 62 rd -BNNI. The problem revealed by the rd -BNNI property
would be solved by requiring h to be a local name of agent P that cannot be
consumed by any high-level user. For instance, we have that Pnh 2 rd -BNNI,
rd -BSNNI. On the contrary, in the synchronous setting of [4], P is neither
BNNI nor BSNNI.
Example 3.8 Let us consider the following slight modication of the agent
of Example 3.7:
Q
def
= out(h):in(h):out(l) + in(h):
47
Aldini
On the one hand, we have Q 2 rd -BNNI. Indeed, both (Qn
I
M
H
)=M
H
and
Q=M
H
are weakly rd -bisimulation equivalent to process  + :out(l). In-
tuitively, Q=M
H
can either evolve into a deadlock state by performing the
right-hand term of the alternative choice operator, or execute a process that,
as seen in Example 3.7, leads to the emission of tuple hli. Moreover, agent
(Qn
I
M
H
)=M
H
behaves as agent (Pn
I
M
H
)=M
H
of Example 3.7, i.e. it can
either deadlock without emitting the message l or output the tuple hli. On the
other hand, it can be veried that Q 62 rd -BSNNI. In particular, the seman-
tics of QnM
H
is the same as that of PnM
H
of Example 3.7, which cannot be
equivalent to +:out(l), as PnM
H
is forced to emit the tuple hli. Dierently
from Example 3.7, in this case rd -BNNI is not able to reveal a covert chan-
nel. Similarly as seen in Example 3.7, note that Qnh 2 rd -BNNI, rd -BSNNI.
Finally, we also point out that, in the synchronous setting of [4], Q is neither
BNNI nor BSNNI.
As we have seen in the examples above, rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI do not
match whenever the agent can consume the tuples that it oers to the en-
vironment. Indeed, in this case the interleaving between the high-level user
operations and the agent activities interferes with the low-level view of the tu-
plespace. We can avoid such a kind of interference if we assume that the agent
distinguishes between tuples oered to the environment (which, therefore, can-
not be consumed by the agent itself) and tuples that the agent employs for
its internal calculations (which must be modeled through local names).
Denition 3.9 An agent P 2 A is said to be a non-consuming producer (ncp,
for short) if 8P
0
: P)P
0
, P
0
a
! implies that P
0
does not enable a  labelled
transition that derives from a synchronization involving label a.
For instance, process P of Example 3.7 is not a ncp agent. Indeed, as we
have seen, P can rst emit a tuple hhi, and then can either oer it to the
environment or consume it via a corresponding input operation. On the other
hand, process Pnh is a ncp agent, since, dierently from P , it cannot oer the
tuple hhi to the environment just after emitting it. We can argue similarly for
the agent Q described in Example 3.8.
Denition 3.9 allows rd -BNNI and rd -BSNNI to be related, as stated by
the following proposition. Instead, we recall that in the synchronous commu-
nication setting BNNI 6 BSNNI and BSNNI 6 BNNI [4].
Proposition 3.10 If P 2 A is a non-consuming producer, then
P 2 rd-BNNI, P 2 rd-BSNNI:
Proof. Let P be an agent and R be a relation dened as follows:
((P
0
n
I
M
H
)=M
H
; P
0
nM
H
) 2 R, 8P
0
: P)P
0
.
We now prove that R is a weak rd-bisimulation up to 
B
rd
3
. By inspection
3
The denition is a straightforward extension of that of [14].
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of possible cases, it follows:

if P
0
nM
H

! P
00
nM
H
then (P
0
n
I
M
H
)=M
H

! (P
00
n
I
M
H
)=M
H
, since the
transitions enabled in P
0
nM
H
are a subset of the transitions enabled in
(P
0
n
I
M
H
)=M
H
;

if (P
0
n
I
M
H
)=M
H

! (P
00
n
I
M
H
)=M
H
, where  is either a visible action or
a  action that is not obtained by hiding a

h labelled transition enabled
in P
0
n
I
M
H
, then P
0
nM
H

! P
00
nM
H
, since  models an event of term P
0
that is not restricted in P
0
nM
H
.

if P
0
= hhijP
00
and ((hhijP
00
)n
I
M
H
)=M
H

! (P
00
n
I
M
H
)=M
H
, then, since
P is a ncp agent, we have that (hhijP
00
)nM
H
 (0jP
00
)nM
H
 P
00
nM
H
.
Therefore, R is a weak rd-bisimulation up to
B
rd
and PnM
H

B
rd
(Pn
I
M
H
)=
M
H
, from which we immediately derive the result. 2
An expected result is given by the following lemma, which conrms that
the high-level outputs do not interfere with the observable behavior of a ncp
agent.
Lemma 3.11 If P 2 A is a non-consuming producer, then
P=
O
M
H

B
rd
Pn
O
M
H
:
Proof. A straightforward application of the proof of Proposition 3.10. 2
We point out that the restriction to non-consuming producers is reason-
able in an asynchronous setting, since in practice such an assumption states
that once a signal (output communication) is emitted by the agent, then the
environment can eventually consume it.
In general, we can summarize the presentation of the noninterference prop-
erties by emphasizing the following results, as also graphically reported in
Fig. 3.

In a synchronous setting SNNI is stricter than NNI, while BSNNI and BNNI
do not satisfy any inclusion relation. In an asynchronous setting rd-NNI and
rd-SNNI turn out to have the same expressive power. Such an equivalence
holds also when passing to the weak rd-bisimulation equivalence, provided
that we restrict ourselves to the set of non-consuming producers.

NNI and rd-NNI have the same expressive power in the sense that they
capture the same illegal interferences, i.e. those that are caused by high-
level inputs. This is because in both communication models input is a
blocking operation.

As a consequence of the considerations above, SNNI is stricter than rd-SNNI.
This is because the asynchronous assumption prevents the high-level user
from setting up a covert channel based on output operations.
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NNI
SNNI
BNNI
BSNNI
NNIrd− SNNIrd−=
BNNIrd− = BSNNIrd−*
*for non−consuming producers only.
Fig. 3. Relation among properties in synchronous/asynchronous models.
3.3 The Access Monitor Example
In this section, we consider as a simple case study an access monitor (similarly
as done in [6]) and we show (i) the kind of information ow that can be revealed
in the asynchronous setting, and (ii) the main dierences with respect to an
approach based on a synchronous communication model.
Let us consider system Sys of Table 3 representing an access monitor that
handles read and write requests on a low-level binary variable enforcing the
multi-level security policy [2]. We recall that such a policy says that a process
at -security level may only (i) write variables at the same level or above
(write up), and (ii) read variables at the same level or below (read down).
Agent Monitor accepts all the user requests and has direct access to agent
Low Bit , which in turn handles the binary variable, whose initial value is 0
(see tuple hb
0
i). Moreover, the interactions between Monitor and Low Bit and
the operations internally performed by Low Bit are local (i.e., any user cannot
oer/consume the related tuples, as imposed by the restriction operators in
agent Sys). Agent Monitor interacts with the environment by consuming the
messages low r , denoting a low-level read request, high r , denoting a high-
level read request, low w
0
and low w
1
, denoting low-level write requests, and
by emitting the high- (low-) level messages h
i
(l
i
), for i 2 f0; 1g, denoting that
the value i is communicated to the environment. Note that, according to the
multi-level security policy, high-level write requests (high w
0
; high w
1
) are not
satised, since a high-class user cannot write a low-security variable.
In the following, we assume that a single low-level user interacts with the
system and we show what such a user can learn about the high-security op-
erations by manipulating the low-level variable. The noninterference analysis
reveals that Sys 2 rd-BSNNI. Moreover, we point out that Sys is a ncp agent.
Therefore, it satises also the rd-BNNI property. However, if we allow agent
Monitor to satisfy high-level write requests, then the write up condition is
violated. Formally, if we add to the algebraic specication the alternative
behaviors
in(high w
0
):out(w
0
):in(ack):Monitor +
in(high w
1
):out(w
1
):in(ack):Monitor
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Low Bit
def
=
in(r):(rd(b
0
):out(r
0
):Low Bit + rd(b
1
):out(r
1
):Low Bit)+
in(w
0
):(rd(b
0
):out(ack):Low Bit + in(b
1
):out(b
0
):out(ack):Low Bit)+
in(w
1
):(rd(b
1
):out(ack):Low Bit + in(b
0
):out(b
1
):out(ack):Low Bit)
Monitor
def
=
in(low r):out(r):(in(r
0
):out(l
0
):Monitor + in(r
1
):out(l
1
):Monitor)+
in(high r):out(r):(in(r
0
):out(h
0
):Monitor + in(r
1
):out(h
1
):Monitor)+
in(low w
0
):out(w
0
):in(ack):Monitor +
in(low w
1
):out(w
1
):in(ack):Monitor +
in(high w
0
):Monitor + in(high w
1
):Monitor
Sys
def
= (Monitor j (Low Bit j hb
0
i)nfb
0
; b
1
g)nfr; r
0
; r
1
; w
0
; w
1
; ackg
Table 3
Access monitor example
then neither rd-BSNNI nor rd-SNNI are satised. For both properties, the
equivalence checking captures the fact that, e.g., the low-level user perceives
the high-level interference by rst reading l
0
and then reading l
1
in two con-
secutive read operations.
The same example, based on a synchronous communication model, is pre-
sented in [6], where it is shown that the corresponding properties hold under
the same conditions.
Now, assume that a high-level output is added to inform the high-security
user that a low-level write operation occurred. This can be modeled by adding
the high-level output out(written i), for i 2 f0; 1g, to agent Monitor as fol-
lows:
in(low w
0
):out(w
0
):in(ack):out(written 0):Monitor +
in(low w
1
):out(w
1
):in(ack):out(written 1):Monitor :
In the synchronous setting such a version of the monitor does not satisfy
the SNNI property [6], since the high-security user can refuse the feedback
concerning the low-level write operation. Hence, two consecutive low-level
write operations can be exploited to inform the low-security user that the
high-class user is still active. Such a behavior is more than enough to set up a
1-bit covert channel from high level to low level. In our asynchronous setting,
it can be veried that such a version of the access monitor is still secure. This
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is because the high-level user cannot block or delay the output oered by the
monitor, which is interpreted as an independent activity (a signal) instead of
a synchronous, direct interaction with the high-level user.
4 Related Work and Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two semantics for the formalization of noninterfer-
ence properties in the context of a process algebra with asynchronous commu-
nication based on Linda-like coordination primitives. The security properties,
borrowed from [4], are based on both a trace semantics and a bisimulation
semantics. To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the rst ef-
fort to combine the noninterference approach to information ow theory and
the Linda coordination model. Along these lines of investigation, a work on
asynchronous communication in process algebras and a variety of security
properties has been recently done by Hennessy and Riely in [9]. In particular,
they dene an extension of the asynchronous -calculus in which resource ac-
cess control and secure information ow can be veried using types. The type
system that is proposed for establishing noninterference works if the notion of
process behavior, necessary to formalize a noninterference result, is restricted
to a may testing equivalence.
As a future work, interesting results might be obtained by employing well-
established equational theories developed for asynchronous calculi (see, e.g.,
[10,1,11]). Moreover, as far as the noninterference analysis is concerned, the
classication of security properties of [4] includes many more denitions that
express a slightly dierent intuition of what noninterference means. Among
them we cite Nondeducibility on Composition (NDC), which states that an ac-
tive high-level agent interacting with the system has not to alter the low-level
behavior of the system. In such a framework, the active agent is formalized
as a process that performs high-level actions only and is put in parallel with
the system. Because of the synchronous nature of the communication model,
the active agent decides which input/output operations of the system will be
chosen for execution and which ones, instead, will never occur. However, in
a Linda-like communication model, the only interesting interactions between
the system and the active agent concern the high-level input operations that
the system is allowed to perform. Such observations lead us to consider the
Nondeducibility on Strategies property (NDS) of [15], whose main dierence
with respect to NDC is given by the synchronous nature of the output op-
eration adopted in [4]. In particular, a strategy is a function that, looking
at previous high-level inputs and outputs, decides the new high-level input.
Then, the NDS basic idea is that the system, when composed to any strategy,
has not to alter its behavior as observed by a low-level observer. On the basis
of such a principle, we plan to redene in our setting a NDC-like property
that expresses the same intuition as that behind the notion of NDS.
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